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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 








v. ) Civil Action No. 11-1635
)
)






CONTI, Chief District Judge.
This is an employment discrimination case. Pending before the court is a 
motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 45) filed by defendant Johnson & Johnson, Inc. 
t/d/b/a Ethicon, Inc. (“Ethicon”) seeking judgment as a matter of law against plaintiff 
Norma Bielich (“Bielich”) with respect to all claims asserted in her first amended 
complaint. (ECF No. 14.) In her fourteen-count complaint, Bielich claims that Ethicon 
a) treated her less favorably due to her gender and disability, b) failed to accommodate her 
disability, c) subjected her to a hostile work environment based on her disability, and d) 
subjected her to retaliation based upon her request for an accommodation. Bielich asserts 
claims pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -  2000e-17 (“Title VII”), the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 -  12117 (the “ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
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-  963 (the “PHRA”). Bielich seeks monetary relief, including punitive damages and 
attorneys’ fees, as well as unspecific injunctive relief against Ethicon.
This court exercises subject-matter jurisdiction over Bielich’s federal 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over her state-law claims under the PHRA 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j)(3).
For the reasons set forth below, the court finds that Ethicon’s motion for 
summary judgment must be granted, in part, and denied, in part. The only claims triable to 
a jury are the failure to accommodate claims Bielich asserts under the ADA and the PHRA.
I. Factual Background
The factual background is derived from the undisputed evidence of record 
and the disputed evidence of record viewed in the light most favorable to Bielich. See 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Other undisputed facts may 
be discussed in the context of each of Bielich’s legal claims where appropriate.
A. Bielich’s Employment and Performance History at Ethicon
Plaintiff was hired by Ethicon in 1998 as a field sales representative and was 
promoted to the position of professional education manger in 2006. (ECF No. 63 ^ 1.) As 
a professional education manager, Bielich a) planned, coordinated, and facilitated 
professional education events, b) recruited, contracted, trained, and administered 
consultants, and c) attended meetings, provided status reports, and managed 
communications from sales personnel. (Id. ^ 2.) At the time she was hired, Bielich was 
qualified for the position. (Id. ^ 80.) It is disputed that Bielich remained qualified for the 
position if she suffered from the limitations that she articulates in the summary judgment 
submissions. (Id.)
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In May 2009, Michael Willick (“Willick”) became Bielich’s supervisor. (Id. 
^ 10.) Prior to this time, Willick had been Bielich’s peer on the professional education 
team, and Andrew Hart (“Hart”) supervised them both. (Id.) After Willick’s promotion, 
the other members of Bielich’s professional education team were Rick Summerlin 
(“Summerlin”) and, later, Timothy Mauri (“Mauri”). (Id. ^ 11.) In August 2009, Mauri 
joined the professional education team because the workload being carried by Summerlin 
and Bielich resulted in them both “working extraordinarily hard and long hours.” (Id. ^  
11, 72, 110.) All members of the team worked remotely from different locations 
throughout the country. (Id. ^ 12.) Bielich worked from her home in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. (Id.) By July 2009, Bielich reported to Willick, Willick reported to Richard 
Merklinger (“Merklinger”), Merklinger reported to David Bourdeau (“Bourdeau”), the 
group director of Worldwide Professional Education, and Bourdeau reported to Sandra 
Humbles, the vice president of Global Education Solutions. (Id. ^ 15.)
On April 24, 2009, while still her supervisor, Hart gave Bielich an annual 
evaluation of her 2008 job performance. (Id. ^ 13.) During this evaluation, Bielich was 
told that she was not meeting expectations, that her performance was not acceptable, that 
she would be placed on a sixty-day performance development plan, and if she was still not 
meeting expectations would then be placed on a ninety-day performance improvement 
plan. (Id. ^  13, 16; ECF No. 48-1 at 18; ECF No. 52 at 35-36.) Hart gave her a numerical 
rating of 4 out of 10 for her work in 2008. (ECF No. 63 ^  13, 90.) On Monday April 27, 
2009, although she did not have an appointment, Bielich drove from Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, to the company’s headquarters in Somerville, New Jersey, to meet with 
Bourdeau. (Id. ^ 14.) Bielich told Bourdeau she was shocked by her poor evaluation,
3
Case 2:11-cv-01635-JFC Document 71 Filed 03/20/14 Page 4 of 54
apologized, and told him she would do her absolute best to improve her performance. (Id.) 
During this meeting Bielich told Bourdeau that she was confused and exhausted and that 
she had been struggling, but did not know how to explain it; she did not tell Bourdeau that 
she was unable to do her job for medical reasons, and did not ask for an accommodation for 
any disability. (Id. ^  14, 92.)
On June 19, 2009, Willick, who had recently become Bielich’s supervisor, 
sent the sixty-day development plan to her via email. (Id. ^ 20.) Bielich reviewed, signed, 
and faxed back a copy of the plan to Willick on June 22, 2009. (Id.) The sixty-day plan 
identified two areas where management believed Bielich demonstrated a need for 
improvement: “sense of urgency” and “collaboration and teaming.” (Id. ^ 21.) Willick 
and Bielich had several bi-weekly telephone calls during the term of the sixty-day plan to 
discuss Bielich’s progress as compared to the objectives of the plan. (Id. ^  24.) During the 
sixty-day plan period, Bielich received both positive and negative feedback: Willick 
complimented Bielich on completing certain tasks, but two internal customers and an 
employee in a different Ethicon department expressed concerns with Bielich’s timeliness 
in completing other tasks and responding to inquiries. (Id. ^  25-28.)
Bielich met with Willick, in Dallas, Texas, on September 10, 2009, to 
discuss her performance under the sixty-day plan. (Id. ^ 33.) Willick informed Bielich 
that she failed to satisfy the objectives of her sixty-day plan, shared with her negative 
feedback about her performance that had been submitted by internal customers, and told 
her that she would be placed on a ninety-day performance improvement plan (“PIP”). (Id. 
^  33, 36.) Internal customers also submitted positive feedback about Bielich during the 
sixty-day plan period, although Willick did not review positive comments during the
4
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meeting. (Id. ^ 112.) Willick asked Bielich to develop and submit the objectives for her 
PIP, which Bielich did. (Id ^ 37.) Bielich submitted her PIP objectives, with relevant 
deadlines, to Willick via email on October 8, 2009. (Id. ^  37, 40.) In response, Willick 
asked Bielich if she “felt comfortable with this plan.. .that it can be accomplished,” to 
which Bielich answered “It HAS to be accomplished!” (Id. ^ 38.) Willick reviewed the 
objectives, along with the deadlines established by Bielich, and approved the PIP. (Id. ^ 
39.) Shortly after the approved PIP was transmitted to Bielich, she extended some of the 
deadlines, for various reasons, to which Willick did not object. (Id. ^ 41.) The PIP stated 
that Bielich’s employment could be terminated prior to expiration of the ninety-day review 
period if, for example, significant and sustained progress was not being made. (Id. ^ 145.)
During the course of the PIP, Bielich and one of her supervisors, either 
Willick or Merklinger, met weekly via telephone to review her progress, and Bielich 
submitted weekly written reports to Willick. (Id. ^  42.) Willick sent multiple reminders of 
deadlines and assignments to Bielich during her PIP, and both Merklinger and he provided 
Bielich with positive reinforcement during her PIP. (Id. ^  46.) It is undisputed that Bielich 
missed various deadlines set forth in her PIP, and missed deadlines otherwise set by 
management during this time period for various tasks. (Id. ^  48-58, 125, 147-51.) 
Willick was responsible for notifying upper management whether or not Bielich met the 
requirements of her PIP. (Id. ^  132-33.)
Willick emailed Merklinger and Lena Tai (“Tai”), a member of Ethicon’s 
human resources department, on December 22, 2009, with a draft letter for terminating 
Bielich’s employment. (Id. ^  60, 120.) He requested a termination date of January 19, 
2010. (Id.) In the draft termination letter, Willick wrote that Bielich was being terminated
5
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for continuing performance deficiencies with respect to demonstrating a “sense of 
urgency” with respect to meeting deadlines, attaining goals, and for violating Ethicon’s 
standards by discussing personal issues with other employees and making “purely 
emotional comments” after being directed by management not to do so. (Id. ^ 127; see 
sections I.B. and I.C., below.) On January 5, 2010, Willick emailed Tai to finalize 
arrangements for Bielich’s termination and to suggest January 21, 2010, as the date of 
termination. (Id. ^ 61.) Violating Ethicon’s standards does not appear as a reason for 
termination in the revised termination letter emailed by Willick to Tai on that date, or in the 
final termination memorandum. (Id. ^ 131.)
Willick, Merklinger, and Tai met with Bielich on January 21, 2010, in the 
Hyatt Hotel at the Pittsburgh Airport to notify Bielich about her termination, effective that 
date. (Id. ^ 63.) Willick gave Bielich a memorandum regarding her termination. (Id.; ECF 
No. 52-7 at 26-28.) The memorandum stated that “you have attempted to do the minimum 
expected, but your performance has failed to satisfy the performance goals/objectives and 
you have not demonstrated the [Global Leadership Profile] behaviors that were set forth in 
your 2009 PIP and Action Plan.” (ECF No. 63 ^ 64.) In the memorandum Willick a) set 
forth several deadlines that Bielich had missed, b) noted Bielich’s admission in a 
December 11, 2009 email that she had “some catching up to do” and was “behind” on her 
goals, and c) recounted a complaint that he had received in November 2009 with respect to 
Bielich’s timeliness in arranging reimbursement of a dinner event. (Id. ^ 143.) Ethicon 
hired two security guards to be seated outside the room during the termination meeting. (Id. 
^ 140.) When Timothy McGinnis was fired at the Pittsburgh Airport, Ethicon did not hire 
security guards. (Id. ^ 141.) Bielich was replaced by a male, Hasan Campbell. (Id. ^ 152.)
6
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B. Bielich’s Relationship with Dr. Heniford
Between October 2006 until approximately October 2007, Bielich had a 
consensual sexual affair with Dr. Todd Heniford (“Heniford”). (Id. ^ 3.) Heniford was an 
outside consultant and “Key Opinion Leader” for Ethicon. (Id.) Bielich dealt with him on 
business matters on behalf of Ethicon. (Id.) In late July 2007, Bielich was diagnosed with 
a sexually transmitted disease (“STD”), HPV, which was asymptomatic and discovered 
during a routine OB/GYN examination. (Id. ^ 6.) Bielich attributes contraction of this 
disease to Heniford. (Id. ^  45, 122.) On January 2, 2008, Bielich had surgery to remove 
the HPV, and it has not recurred. (Id.)
Bielich kept her relationship with Heniford a secret until early January 
2008, when she told Hart, her then-manager, about the relationship and her contraction of 
HPV as a result. (Id. ^  5, 82.) Upon making this disclosure to him, Hart indicated that he 
had contracted the same STD. (Id. ^ 129.) Hart recommended that Bielich disclose her 
relationship to the other team members, at that time, Jennifer Bailey and Summerlin, in 
order to explain why she would prefer not to be assigned to events involving Heniford; 
which she did. (Id. ^ 82.)
In early October 2009, Bielich told her co-worker, Michelle Barczack, 
about her relationship with Heniford and that she had been diagnosed as suffering from 
premenstrual dysphoric disorder (“PMDD”). (Id. ^ 115.) On October 26, 2009, Bielich, 
Willick, and Merklinger had a conference call to discuss the PIP, during which Bielich was 
advised that concerns had been expressed to management about Bielich’s discussion at 
work of her relationship with Heniford, her contraction of and surgery for an STD, and her 
PMDD. (Id. ^ 44.) According to Bielich, Willick and Merklinger told her “not to share
7
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details of her personal life in order to explain or justify any performance deficiencies” and 
that her PIP and personal issues, including PMDD, were “completely separated.” (Id. ^  
44, 116.) On December 3, 2009, Bielich told a co-worker, Dan Patterson, about her 
previous relationship with Heniford and that he had given her an STD. (Id. ^  45, 122.) 
Willick became aware of this disclosure and told Bielich that Tai would be discussing the 
matter with her. (Id. ^  122-23.) After that time, Bielich contends that Willick became 
less supportive of and nice to her, and was “very angry” with her. (Id.) Tai addressed the 
matter with Bielich during an in-person meeting on December 15, 2013, by chastising her 
for what she characterized as unprofessional behavior. (Id. ^ 124.)
C. Bielich’s Disclosure of Medical Condition
On June 1, 2009, Bielich was diagnosed as suffering from PMDD. (Id. ^  74; 
ECF No. 52-7 at 8.) PMDD is classified as a mood disorder, and causes Bielich to 
experience chronic fatigue, difficulty concentrating, feelings of despair and mental 
paralysis, bouts of uncontrollable crying, and suicidal thoughts. (ECF No. 63 ^  75, 76.) 
These episodes last about two weeks each month. (Id. ^  76.) PMDD limits Bielich’s brain 
function, by causing her to lose focus and concentration, and to take extra time to 
accomplish certain tasks. (Id. ^ 77.) Bielich treats this condition with medication. (Id. ^ 
78.) Although Bielich began seeing a licensed therapist in June 2008, she stopped seeing 
that clinician around June 2009, and did not see another therapist during the time period at 
issue in this case. (Id. ^ 7.) Bielich was diagnosed with depression after she was 
terminated. (Id. ^ 8.)
8
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According to Bielich, she informed Ethicon about her condition, and the 
adverse effect it was having on her work performance, on six occasions: (1) a June 2, 2009 
telephone call with Willick; (2) a June 24, 2009 telephone call with Tai; (3) an August 28, 
2009 in-person meeting with Merklinger in Chicago, Illinois; (4) a September 10, 2009 
in-person meeting with Willick in Dallas, Texas; (5) a December 15, 2009 in-person 
meeting with Tai; and (6) a January 6, 2010 email to Willick. (Id. ^  19, 94.) There is no 
genuine dispute that Bielich never made an explicit request for an accommodation from 
Ethicon; instead, Bielich contends that she implicitly requested an accommodation by 
disclosing her medical condition and explaining that it was negatively affecting her 
performance at work. (Id. ^  19, 22.)
On June 2, 2009, Bielich phoned Willick to tell him she was diagnosed with 
PMDD, was getting treatment for the disorder by starting medication, and now knew why 
she had been performing so badly in the past. (Id. ^  18, 19.) Bielich’s deposition 
testimony indicates that she told Willick “that there was a reason that I hadn’t been 
performing up to my potential, that there was a reason that I had made so many mistakes” 
and that PMDD “explains why I’ve been having so much trouble at work.” (ECF No. 52-1 
at 4.) Willick told Bielich that this information was “personal” and that if she wanted to 
discuss it further she should contact Tai, a human resources department employee. (Id. at 
4-5.)
Bielich and Tai arranged a telephone call, to take place on June 24, 2009, 
because Tai would be involved in the sixty-day performance plan process. (ECF No. 63 ^  
19, 22; ECF No. 52-1 at 8.) During that phone call, Bielich disclosed her PMDD 
diagnosis and told Tai that she wanted her “to understand why I’ve been struggling. There
9
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is an explanation for what you guys call my poor performance.” (ECF No. 52-1 at 9.) Tai 
responded that the matter was “personal” and indicated that Bielich could contact 
Ethicon’s employee assistance program for counseling. (Id.) Bielich told Tai that she did 
not need to contact the program because she already had a good therapist. (ECF No. 63 ^  
19, 101; ECF No. 52-1 at 9.)
Bielich meet with Merklinger in Chicago, Illinois, on August 28, 2009, 
when they were both there for a work-related conference. (ECF No. 63 ^ 29.) Bielich and 
Merklinger were personal friends, as well as co-workers, and met privately after the day’s 
business meetings to discuss various work and personal matters. (Id.; ECF No. 52-1 at 
14:22-24.) According to Bielich she “broke down” at the meeting and told Merklinger 
“all of the difficulties I was having, how stressed I was. I told him about my medical 
condition, how I had been having suicidal thoughts. I was trying so hard to put on a good 
face” and about her emotional obstacles, fatigue, and the ups and downs with her 
medication. (ECF No. 52-1 at 14-15.) Bielich denies that she told Merlinger she was 
“okay.” (ECF No. 63 ^ 29.) Bielich later stated that during this meeting she knew she 
needed help, but did not know how to ask for it. (Id. ^ 30.) She stated in her deposition 
that she “knew they were going to put me on the PIP. I didn’t know what to do. I was 
afraid - you know, I felt fake it until you make it. Norma, collapsing in front of them is not 
going to do you any good, and I tried like crazy to pull myself together.” (Id.)
Bielich met with Willick, in Dallas, Texas, on September 10, 2009, to 
discuss her performance under the sixty-day plan. (Id. ^ 33.) Willick informed Bielich 
that she failed to satisfy the objectives of her sixty-day plan, shared with her negative 
comments made about her performance by internal customers, and told her that she would
10
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be placed on a ninety-day PIP. (Id. ^  33, 36.) According to Bielich she explained to 
Willick at this meeting that a change in birth control medication made her PMDD 
symptoms worse, and “that is exactly when my decline in performance happened” and that 
“I started my sixty-day development plan strong and I wavered” because her doctor was 
attempting to find the right doses of medication. (ECF No. 52-1 at 21:4-11, 22:1-4; ECF 
No. 63 ^ 34.) Bielich told Willick that she had been exhausted and stressed out due to her 
workload during this meeting. (ECF No. 63 ^ 34.)
Bielich met in-person with Tai on December 15, 2009, to address Bielich’s 
continued discussion of her relationship with Heniford at work. (Id. ^ 59.) According to 
Bielich, during this meeting, she explained to Tai how her PMDD made her unfocused and 
unable to complete tasks in a timely manner (Id. ^  19, 59; ECF No. 52-1 at 3-4.)
Bielich and Willick exchanged a series of email communications on 
January 6, 2010, in which Bielich responded to Willick’s “concerns about [her] 
performance.” (ECF No. 63 ^ 62; ECF No. 52-7 at 10.) In a message sent by Bielich at 
10:51 p.m., Bielich referenced her diagnosis with “a medical condition that I immediately 
sought help for” and stated that “I told you and Lena [Tai] that the onset of this condition 
perfectly corresponds to the decline in my performance.” (ECF No. 63 ^ 134; ECF No. 
52-7 at 8.)
When an employee informs an Ethicon manager that he or she has a mental 
impairment that is affecting job performance, the employee is to be referred to Ethicon’s 
occupational health department in order to determine whether job accommodations are 
needed. (ECF No. 63 ^ 97.) Bielich was never referred to the occupational health 
department. (Id. at 98.)
11
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II. Procedural History
Bielich filed a charge of discrimination and harassment on the basis of 
gender and disability with both the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”). (ECF No. 14 ^ 
5.) The EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Bielich on September 30, 2011. (Id.) The 
instant complaint was filed on April 17, 2012. (Id.)
In her first amended complaint, Bielich makes a series of discrimination and 
retaliation claims based upon her gender and alleged disability. (ECF No. 14.)
• In Counts I and X, Bielich alleges that Ethicon violated Title VII and the 
PHRA by subjecting her to disparate treatment based on her gender. (ECF 
No. 14 ^  154, 286.)
• In Counts II, VI, and XI, Bielich alleges that Ethicon violated the ADA, the 
RA, and the PHRA by subjecting her to disparate treatment based on her 
alleged disability. (Id. ^  165-68, 219-22, and 299-302.)
• In Counts III, VII, and XII, Bielich alleges that Ethicon violated the ADA, 
the RA and the PHRA by failing to accommodate her alleged disability, 
PMDD. (Id. ^  177-81, 236-40, and 312-16.)
• In Counts IV, VIII, and XIII, Bielich alleges that Ethicon subjected her to a 
hostile work environment on the basis of her alleged disability, in violation 
of the ADA, the RA, and the PHRA. (Id. ^  189-99, 253-63, and 325-35.)
• In Counts V, IX, and XIV, Bielich alleges that Ethicon retaliated against her 
for engaging in protected activities, namely her implicit request for
12
Case 2:11-cv-01635-JFC Document 71 Filed 03/20/14 Page 13 of 54
accommodation, in violation of the ADA, the RA, and the PHRA. (Id. ^  
206-08, 275-77, and 343-45.)
Ethicon asserts in its motion for summary judgment that it is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law with respect to each of Bielich’s legal claims because Bielich
failed to meet her evidentiary burdens to support any of them. (ECF No. 46.) The court
will address each grouping of legal claims below, but, in summary, finds that only the
failure to accommodate claims made pursuant to the ADA and the PHRA are supported by
sufficient evidence to warrant submission to a jury.
III. Applicable Law
A. Summary Judgment Standards
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides in relevant part:
(a) Motion for Summary Judgment or Partial Summary 
Judgment. A party may move for summary judgment, 
identifying each claim or defense -  or the part of each claim 
or defense -  on which summary judgment is sought. The 
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The 
court should state on the record the reasons for granting or 
denying the motion.
(c) Procedures.
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that 
a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the 
assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 
including depositions, documents, electronically stored 
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations 
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), 
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
13
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(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the 
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse 
party cannot produced admissible evidence to support the 
fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c)(1)(A), (B).
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “mandates 
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to 
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the 
record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his 
burden of proof.” (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-26; Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 
248-52)).
“[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 
56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that 
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ...
Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 
genuine issue for trial.’”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
14
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In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and 
resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Doe v. Cnty. of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 
437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. Of Phila. Bd. Of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 
(3d Cir. 2001); Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 1999). A court 
must not engage in credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage. Simpson v. 
Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 n.3 (3d Cir. 1998).
When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving 
party may discharge its burden by pointing out “that there is an absence of evidence to 
support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party 
has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who cannot simply 
rest on the allegations in the pleadings and must “do more than simply show that there is 
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586. 
Summary judgment is proper in cases where the nonmoving party’s evidence in opposition 
is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
B. Title VII
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer (1) to ... discharge any individual... because of such individual’s ... sex.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Claims under the PHRA are interpreted coextensively with Title 
VII claims. Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 317 n.3 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). The court will refer only to Title 
VII in this opinion for ease of reference.
15
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C. The ADA
The ADA provides that “ [n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to ... discharge of employees.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(a). The PHRA similarly prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
disability. 43 P.S. § 955(a). The ADA’s antiretaliation provision states that “[n]o person 
shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or 
practice made lawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this 
chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). The same is true under the PHRA. 43 P.S. § 955(d).
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub.L. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (2008), became effective on January 1, 2009, and applies to this case because 
Bielich was removed from her position on January 21, 2010. (ECF No. 51 at 3 n.1.) The 
ADAAA broadens the ADA’s scope by expanding the definition of disability, which had 
been narrowed by Supreme Court interpretation, and by requiring a “less searching 
analysis” of whether a plaintiff is “substantially limited.” Pub.L. No. 110-325, §§ 
2(b)(1)-(6), 3(2)(a), § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555; Kravits v. Shinseki, No. 10-861, 2012 
WL 604169, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012). The ADAAA changed the language of § 
12112(a) from prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual “because o f ’ 
disability, to “on the basis of” disability. It is not yet clear whether this change in 
language will result in the less-exacting, motivating factor test being applied to ADA 
disability discrimination claims. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 
(6th Cir. 2012) (refusing to import the motivating factor test, applicable to Title VII 
discrimination cases, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), into the ADA, even after the ADAAA
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changed the language of § 12112(a)); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 
957, 961-62 (7th Cir. 2010) (similar); compare Siring v. Oregon St. Bd. Of Higher Educ., 
No. 11-1407, 2013 WL 5636718, *3 (D. Or. Oct. 15, 2013) (finding that the ADAAA 
confirms that the motivating factor test, and not the determinative factor test, applies to 
disability discrimination claims). The difference between the motivating factor and 
determinative factor tests is discussed in section IV.C.1(b), and footnote 2, infra.
The Pennsylvania legislature has failed to enact similar amendments to the 
PHRA. Szarawara v. Cnty. of Montgomery, No. 12-5714, 2013 WL 3230691, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. June 27, 2013); Canfield v. Movie Tavern, Inc., No. 13-03484, 2013 WL 6506320, *5 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2013); Deseme v. Madlyn & Leonard Abramson Ctr. for Jewish Life, 
Inc., No. 10-03694, 2012 WL 1758187, *3 n.3 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2012). As a result, 
some courts have refused to continue simultaneously analyzing ADA and PHRA claims. 
Id. Because, in this case, the court presumes for purposes of deciding the instant summary 
judgment motion, that Bielich can establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination 
and retaliation, and because she is unable to prove that Ethicon’s reasons for terminating 
her were pretextual under either the motivating or determinative factor test, her ADA and 
PHRA claims can, and will, be considered together. Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNK, LLC, 675 
F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2012); Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 433 n.3 (3d Cir. 
2009); Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter Sch., Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 318-19 (3d Cir. 
2008); Williams v. Phila. House. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997); Lescoe v Pennsylvania 
Dept. of Corrections, 464 F.App’x 50, 52 n.6 (3d Cir. 2012); Flory v. Pinnacle Health
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Hospitals, 346 F.App’x 872, 875 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009). The court will refer only to the ADA 
in this opinion for ease of reference.
IV. Discussion
A. RA Claims (Counts VI -  IX)
“The Rehabilitation Act ... prohibits disability-based discrimination by 
government agencies and other recipients of federal funds....” Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 
76, 78 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1514-15 (2d Cir. 
1995)). Ethicon moved for entry of judgment as a matter of law on each of Bielich’s RA 
claims on the grounds that there is no private right of action under § 503 of the RA, and 
Ethicon is not a recipient of federal financial assistance for purposes of § 504. (ECF No. 46 
at 21; ECF No. 53 at 11.) Bielich responds to Ethicon’s arguments by stating summarily 
that Ethicon is subject to the RA because it is a federal government contractor that “has 
sold products to the federal government.” (ECF No. 51 at 26; ECF No. 63 ^ 79.)
Section 503 of the RA does not create a private cause of action. Bowers v. 
NCAA, 346 F.3d 402, 432 (3d Cir. 2003); see Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 
679 F.2d 1077, 1078 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Although § 504 of the RA does create a 
private cause of action, the law is well-settled that in order to establish a violation of this 
section, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that defendant engaged in a program or 
activity that receives federal financial assistance. Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. 
Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 1998).
Bielich’s evidence on this element of her claim is nothing more than a bald 
statement that defendant is a federal government contractor. This is insufficient to subject 
a defendant to liability under § 504 of the RA. Culp v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., No.
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90-1927, 1991 WL 398715, at *1 n.1 (ED. Pa. Aug. 13, 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 1566 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Bielich submits no details regarding the alleged government contracts to 
which Ethicon is subject, the fair market value of the goods or services being exchanged, or 
the circumstances under which Ethicon receives federal financial assistance within the 
meaning of the RA.
Bielich failed to produce any evidence to support her allegation that Ethicon 
is subject to § 504 of the RA. Because Bielich failed to make a sufficient evidentiary 
showing on an essential element of her claim, no reasonable jury could find in her favor on 
any of her RA claims. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586; Liberty 
Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50. For this reason, judgment as a matter of law will be entered in 
Ethicon’s favor with respect to Counts VI, VII, VIII, and IX.
B. Hostile Work Environment Claims (Counts IV, VIII, and XIII)
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has assumed, without deciding,
that a hostile environment claim exists under the ADA. Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of
Southeastern Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 666-67 & n.2 (3d Cir.1999). The elements of such a
claim are: (1) the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA; (2) she
was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her disability or a
request for an accommodation; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of her employment and to create an abusive working environment; and
(5) that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
prompt effective remedial action. Id. at 667. The Supreme Court has stated:
[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be 
determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These 
may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
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or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee's work performance.
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
Ethicon seeks entry ofjudgment as a matter of law on Bielich’s hostile work
environment claims on the ground that she is unable to establish that she was subjected to
severe or pervasive harassment because of her disability. (ECF No. 46 at 17.) Bielich does
not respond to Ethi con’s motion in this regard in her opposition brief. (ECF No. 51.)
Bielich’s sur-reply brief likewise contains no facts, law, or argument with respect to these
claims, even though Ethicon explicitly noted in its reply brief that Bielich’s opposition
brief was deficient in this respect. (ECF No. 51; ECF No. 53 at 11; ECF No. 68.) Because
Bielich makes no argument and submits no evidence in support of her hostile work
environment claims, on which she will bear the burden of proof at trial, the claims cannot
survive summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 586;
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
The court, nevertheless, independently reviewed the record and found no 
evidence that could support a reasonable jury finding that Bielich was subjected to severe 
and pervasive harassment based on her disability that rose to the level of altering the 
conditions of her employment. The record is devoid of any evidence that Bielich was 
harassed at work for any reason.
For these reasons, judgment as a matter of law will be entered in Ethicon’s 
favor with respect to Counts IV, VIII, and XIII.
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C. Gender Discrimination Claims (Counts I and X)
1) Applicable Law
a) The Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII, a 
plaintiff must satisfy a four-part test. The plaintiff must show that: (1) she belongs to a 
protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subjected to an adverse 
employment action;1 and (4) the circumstances of the adverse action “give rise to an 
inference of unlawful discrimination.” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 
169 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Makky v. Chertoff. 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008)). The 
fourth prong can be established by showing that similarly situated individuals who were 
not members of the protected class were treated more favorably than the plaintiff. Nguyen 
v. AK Steel Corp., 735 F. Supp. 2d 346, 361 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Jones v. Sch. Dist. Of 
Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999)).
b) Pretext
Bielich’s gender discrimination claims, as well as her disability
discrimination claims, and disability retaliation claims, are analyzed pursuant to the
familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC,
675 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2012)(citing cases); Williams, 380 F.3d at 759; Rinehimer v.
Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2002); Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 134
F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998); Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500. Under the McDonnell Douglas
test, after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
“articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action.
1 The only adverse employment action about which Bielich complains is her termination, 
apart from her failure to accommodate claims, which will be discussed separately in 
section IV.F (ECF No. 51 at 3, 7.)
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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973). For the defendant to 
carry this burden, it must “clearly set forth” a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse employment action. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 
(1981).
If the defendant meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 
“prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the 
defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. at 253 (citing 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804). To establish pretext a plaintiff must present 
specific evidence “from which a fact-finder could reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the 
employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s 
action.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). In order to avoid summary 
judgment, a plaintiff's evidence must allow a fact-finder to reasonably infer that the 
employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason was either a post hoc fabrication or 
otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action. Id.
2 Although the motivating and determinative factor tests are often used interchangeably 
and imprecisely, they are different. The motivating factor test is a less-exacting standard, 
which only applies in this case to Bielich’s gender discrimination claims. Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94-95 (2003). The determinative factor, or “but for,” test 
applies to Bielich’s disability claims. Watson v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207, 214-15, 220 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (disability discrimination); Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500-501 & n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2000); Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1997) (ADA 
retaliation). Our court of appeals’ approach to these kinds of claims is in line with recent 
Supreme Court precedent that applies the determinative factor, or “but for,” test to Title VII
retaliation claims, Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. N assar,__U .S .__ , 133 S.Ct.
2517, 2533 (2013), and discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”), Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.. Inc., 557 U.S.167, 177-79 (2009), 
based at least partly on the fact that Title VII and the ADEA state that the employment 
action must be taken “because” of the individual’s protected characteristic.
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To meet that burden, a plaintiff “cannot simply show that the employer's 
decision was wrong or mistaken.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765. The fact that an employer 
made a poor or unwise decision does not make that decision discriminatory. Brewer v. 
Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that an employer may 
have any reason or no reason for its employment action, so long as it is not a discriminatory 
reason). Instead, evidence undermining an employer's proffered legitimate reasons must 
be sufficient to “support an inference that the employer did not act for its stated reasons.” 
Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 731 (3d Cir. 1995).
Prong one of the Fuentes test focuses on whether a plaintiff submitted 
evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably disbelieve the employer’s articulated 
legitimate reasons for its employment decision. Under this prong, the plaintiff must point 
to “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in 
the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could 
rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence,’ ...and hence infer ‘that the employer did not 
act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (internal 
citations omitted). The question at prong one of the Fuentes test “is not whether the 
employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision;” it is whether the real reason 
for the employment decisions is discrimination. Keller v. ORIX Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 
1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997).
Prong two of the Fuentes test permits a plaintiff to survive summary 
judgment if she can demonstrate, through evidence of record, that “discrimination was 
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment 
action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762; see footnote 2, supra. The kinds of evidence relied upon
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by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit under this prong of the Fuentes analysis are: 
1) whether the employer previously discriminated against the plaintiff; 2) whether the 
employer has discriminated against other persons within the plaintiff's protected class or 
within another protected class; and 3) whether the employer previously treated more 
favorably similarly situated persons not within the protected class. Simpson, 142 F.3d at 
644-45 (3d Cir. 1998).
The two prongs of the Fuentes test are distinct and, where appropriate, will 
be analyzed separately to determine whether sufficient evidence is presented to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment.
2) The Parties’ Arguments
Ethicon contends that judgment must be entered in its favor on these claims 
because Bielich cannot satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case, and, even 
assuming that she could, cannot establish that its legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for 
terminating her were pretextual. (ECF No. 46 at 6-10.) According to Ethicon, Bielich 
cannot establish that males were treated more favorably than she was, and cannot support 
her gender discrimination claims by simply “pointing to the fact that she is a woman.” (Id. 
at 7-8, n.4.) With respect to pretext, Ethicon contends that the record establishes that the 
reasons for Bielich’s termination are true, by Bielich’s own admissions. (Id. at 9-10.) 
Those reasons are her continuing performance deficiencies with respect to demonstrating a 
“sense of urgency,” such as, missing deadlines, admitting to getting behind on her goals, 
and customer and co-worker complaints to that effect.
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In response, Bielich argues that she satisfies the fourth prong of the prima 
facie case because she was replaced by a male, which gives rise to an inference of sex 
discrimination. (ECF No. 51 at 3.) Bielich claims that, having made out a prima facie 
case, she satisfies her burden to overcome summary judgment by pointing to evidence: (1) 
that would support a reasonable inference that males were generally treated more favorably 
at Ethicon than females; and (2) that the sixty- and ninety-day performance plans were not 
“legitimate management tools to measure or improve Bielich’s performance, but rather 
were result-oriented pretexts to cover up discrimination.” (Id. at 17, 21, 23.)
In support of the first contention, Bielich notes that a) security guards were 
present when she was terminated, but not when a male was terminated, b) women were 
punished for discussing personal matters at work, but males were not, and c) males were 
permitted to take medical leave, but females were not. (Id. at 19-20.) In support of the 
second contention, Bielich relies on a) purported procedural flaws in the performance 
review process, b) her opinion that she “did well” on the plans, c) difficulties and increased 
burdens imposed upon her by management during the plans, and d) various other facts of 
record challenging the soundness of Ethicon’s decision-making process. (Id. at 21-22.) 
Bielich addresses each of the missed deadlines that were included in her termination 
memorandum, explaining why the deadline was a) not actually missed, b) flexible, or c) not 
“part of the sixty- or ninety-day plans,” thus allegedly permitting a reasonable jury to 
conclude that the plans were a subterfuge for discrimination. (Id. at 23-26.) In her final 
brief, Bielich contends that a jury could find Ethicon’s proffered reasons for her 
termination to be pretextual because the rationale for her termination was “in continual 
flux.” (ECF No. 68 at 7.)
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Ethicon contends that the fact that a male was hired to replace Bielich is 
without consequence because this is not a failure-to-hire or reduction-in-force case. (ECF 
No. 53 at 2.) Ethicon argues that Bielich cannot establish pretext by second-guessing her 
managers’ conclusion that her performance had not sufficiently improved, especially given 
that she admitted at her deposition to each of the performance deficiencies listed in her 
termination letter. (Id. at 3-4 & n.4; ECF No. 70 at 3, 4-5.)
With respect to the purported unfairness of the review process and the 
now-alleged flexibility of its deadlines, Ethicon notes that Bielich participated in setting 
the deadlines, even being permitted to adjust them in order to provide more time to meet 
them. (ECF No. 68 at 5-6.) Finally, Ethicon explains that different circumstances justify 
each of the purported differences in treatment of the men and women identified by Bielich. 
(Id. at 4-5.) According to Ethicon, Bielich’s situation with respect to discussing personal 
matters at work is distinguishable because she was given a specific instruction, after a 
co-worker complained about her inappropriate conversation at work, to stop discussing her 
relationship with Heniford; yet Bielich disregarded management’s instructions by 
continuing to do so. (ECF No. 53 at 5-6.) With respect to the males identified by Bielich 
who were permitted to take medical leave, by Bielich’s own admission, both suffered from 
physical injuries resulting from a discrete event, i.e., a heart attack and a car accident, 
making their circumstances distinguishable from Bielich’s ongoing health condition. (ECF 
No. 52 ^ 157.)
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3) Discussion and Conclusion
a) The Prima Facie Case
Ethicon challenges Bielich’s ability to satisfy the fourth prong of her prima 
facie case. Bielich’s only argument in direct response is that a male being hired to fill her 
position after she was fired gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. The 
gender of Bielich’s replacement may raise an inference of discrimination, but is not 
necessarily determinative. Pivirotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 355-56 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Williamson v. Penn Millers Ins. Co., No. 04-1142, 2005 WL 3440633, at *5-6 
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2005). For purposes of summary judgment only, the court will assume 
that Bielich can establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, and will consider 
whether Bielich can prove that Ethicon’s proffered reasons for her termination were 
pretexts for gender discrimination.
b) Pretext
Assuming for purposes of deciding the instant motion for summary judgment 
that Bielich can establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, Ethicon articulated 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory, reasons for terminating her, i.e., continuing performance 
deficiencies with respect to demonstrating a “sense of urgency,” such as missing deadlines, 
admitting to getting behind, and customer and co-worker complaints to that effect. It is 
Bielich’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that these were not Ethicon’s true 
reasons for firing her, but were instead pretexts for discrimination. Jones, 198 F.3d at 410. To 
do so, Bielich must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a fact-finder 
could reasonably either: (1) disbelieve Ethicon’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe
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that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating cause of 
Ethicon’s action. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.
The court applies the two-part test of Fuentes to determine whether Bielich can 
prove pretext: prong one focuses on whether there are “such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons 
for its action” that a reasonable jury could find them “unworthy of credence;” and prong two 
permits Bielich to survive summary judgment if she can demonstrate that “discrimination was 
more likely than not a motivating... cause of the adverse employment action” by showing that 
the employer previously discriminated against her or treated employees differently based on 
their gender. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762; Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644-45.
i) Prong One
Bielich identifies a myriad of evidence that purportedly demonstrates that 
Ethicon’s reasons for terminating her are not to be believed. Among this collection is that a) 
her draft termination letter references her disclosure of personal issues as a reason for her 
termination, b) the 2008 performance review conducted by Hart on April 24, 2009, was not in 
writing, c) the deadlines she allegedly missed were flexible and arbitrary, d) she received 
positive as well as negative feedback during her plans, e) her workload was increased during 
the plans, and f) a draft termination letter was prepared before expiration of her ninety-day PIP. 
(ECF No. 51 at 17-26.) In short, Bielich contends that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Ethicon viewed her as a “woman scorned due to disability” and used the sixty- and ninety-day 
plans as a subterfuge for discrimination.
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One common flaw with each of Bielich’s innumerable, individual challenges to 
Ethicon’s reasons for firing her is that Bielich does not, and cannot, dispute that a) a lack of a 
“sense of urgency” was identified by management as an area in need of improvement from the 
inception of the performance review process, b) she, as matter of verifiable proof, repeatedly 
missed deadlines established by management, c) she admitted to management that she missed 
deadlines and got behind on her goals, and d) management received complaints about her 
failure to complete tasks and respond to inquiries in a timely manner from customers and 
co-workers. (ECF No. 63 ^  14, 33, 36, 38, 48-58, 125, 147-51; ECF No. 48-2 at 33-39; ECF 
No. 52-7 at 8.) Regardless what other facts may have existed, such as positive feedback, 
increased workloads, or defects in the review process, management was free to give more 
weight to Bielich’s continued sub-par performance in an area identified at the outset of the 
performance review process as a concern, and terminate her on that basis. The question at 
prong one of the Fuentes test “is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, 
business decision;” it is whether the real reason for the employment decisions is discrimination 
or retaliation. Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109. There is no evidence in the record from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the real reason Bielich was fired was not poor 
performance, but was instead her gender.
Bielich’s argument with respect to pretext suffers from another fundamental 
flaw. It is inherently inconsistent with her failure to accommodate claims. Bielich cannot 
contend for purposes of her gender discrimination claims that Ethicon fabricated her poor 
performance, but then for purposes of her failure to accommodate claims contend that she 
performed poorly only because Ethicon refused to accommodate her disability. Although this 
inconsistency might be tolerable at the pleading and discovery stage, it is no longer tolerable at
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the summary judgment stage. Because Bielich cannot establish pretext under either prong one 
or prong two of the Fuentes test, her gender discrimination claims cannot move forward.
In addition, upon closer examination, none of Bielich’s arguments demonstrate 
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions that would 
permit a reasonable jury to disbelieve that Ethicon fired Bielich due to poor performance, and 
instead believe that she was fired due to her gender. By way of example, Bielich’s draft 
termination letter is not probative of discrimination. With respect to its timing, the ninety-day 
plan explicitly states that employment could be terminated prior to expiration of the plan. (ECF 
No. 63 ^ 145.) Willick’s inclusion of Bielich’s discussion of personal matters at work in his 
draft termination letter is ultimately without consequence. (Id.) Bielich herself characterizes 
Willick as “very angry” after he received another complaint that she was discussing her 
relationship with Heniford and her medical conditions at work after he specifically asked her 
not to do so. (Id. ^  122-23.) Under the circumstances, it is unsurprising that the termination 
letter that Willick drafted, before consultation with other managers and human resources 
officials, references that incident. There is no dispute that Bielich continued to perform 
poorly by missing deadlines, and otherwise demonstrating a lack of a “sense of urgency” to 
management, customers, and co-workers, which were the reasons consistently given to Bielich 
for her termination. (Id. ^  63-64, 143.)
Bielich’s numerous challenges to the procedural and substantive soundness of 
the sixty- and ninety-day performance plans similarly would not permit a reasonable jury to 
disbelieve Ethicon’s reasons for terminating her. There is no evidence that the 2008 annual 
review conducted by Hart on April 24, 2009, was ineffectual because it was not in writing, 
beyond Bielich’s opinion and speculation. Bielich’s numerous complaints about the
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performance plans, such as that her duties were increased, or made more difficult, only 
negative feedback was shared with her, and she did well in some areas, are without ultimate 
consequence. There is no evidence that decisions on any of these issues were made because 
Bielich is a woman. Both she and Summerlin, a male, experienced the same increase in 
workload when their department went from having three employees to two employees upon the 
promotion of Hart and until the hiring of Mauri. Bielich’s alleged positive feedback and 
performance in other areas are irrelevant in light of the record, which demonstrates that 
management expressed concerns with respect to her lack of a consistent “sense of urgency” 
from the beginning, and continually informed her that her performance in that area was not 
satisfactorily improving.
There is no dispute that Bielich missed deadlines, admitted to doing so and to 
getting behind on her goals, and that customers and co-workers complained about her 
timeliness in completing tasks and responding to inquiries. (ECF No. 63 ^  14, 33, 36, 38, 
48-58, 125, 147-51.) Bielich’s many explanations with respect to why those complaints were 
mistaken or unfounded do not negate an employer’s ability to terminate an employee who 
consistently misses deadlines and is the target of repeated complaints for doing so after being 
informed by management that there is a performance deficiency in that area. On the issue of 
deadlines, Beilich’s position that the deadlines in her PIP were flexible, and that she had no 
duty to meet any other deadline set for her by management if it was not listed in her 
performance plans is entirely without merit. Were this the case, Bielich would have had no 
reason to have extended certain deadlines at the beginning of her PIP to allow more time to 
meet them. (Id. ^ 41.) A reasonable jury could not disbelieve Ethicon’s proffered legitimate
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nondiscriminatory reasons based on Bielich’s perceived inequities and alleged flaws in the 
performance review process.
In summary, none of Bielich’s laundry list of challenges to Ethicon’s reasons 
for terminating her rise above second-guessing Ethicon’s business decisions. None of them, 
alone, or in combination, provide sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury finding that 
Ethicon’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons are so implausible that they are unworthy of 
belief, and that gender discrimination was the real reason for Bielich’s termination. Bielich 
admits, as she must in order to advance plausible failure to accommodate claims, that she was 
not performing up to Ethicon’s expectations. (Id. ^  14, 33, 36, 38, 48-58, 125, 147-51.) She 
identifies no evidence of record sufficient to support a reasonable jury finding to the contrary. 
For this reason, she cannot establish that Ethicon’s reasons for terminating her are unworthy of 
belief under the first prong of the Fuentes test. 
ii) Prong Two
Even though Bielich failed to produce evidence that would support a 
reasonable jury finding in her favor under the first prong of the Fuentes test, she can 
survive summary judgment if, under the second prong of the Fuentes test, she demonstrates 
that “discrimination was more likely than not a motivating... cause of the adverse 
employment action.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762. Bielich may do so by showing that: 1)
Ethicon previously discriminated against her; 2) Ethicon discriminated against other 
persons within her protected class; or 3) Ethicon previously treated more favorably 
similarly situated persons not within Bielich’s protected classes. Simpson, 142 F.3d at 
644-45 (3d Cir.1998).
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Bielich does not specifically address this second prong of the Fuentes test, 
and accordingly, fails to identify any evidence pertinent to these three considerations. The 
court nevertheless extrapolated evidence of record from Bielich’s other arguments that 
might be relevant to each factor to determine whether her gender discrimination claims 
could possibly survive summary judgment under prong two of the Fuentes test. The court 
concludes that they cannot.
a) Previous Discrimination Against Bielich
There is no evidence that Ethicon previously discriminated against Bielich.
b) Discrimination Against Other Women
Bielich does submit various pieces of evidence that Ethicon discriminated 
against another woman, Kelly Luedtke (“Luedtke”). Specifically, Bielich claims that a) 
Luedtke was punished for referring to Heniford as an “ass,” while a man, Hart, was not 
punished for making the same kind of comments, (ECF 63 ^ 84), b) Hart refused to 
promote Luedtke because she had four children, (Id. ^ 91), and c) Hart showed Luedtke 
sexually explicit photographs at work, without punishment, (Id.).
The record reflects that Heniford himself became aware of Luedtke’s 
alleged comment, and he discussed the matter with one of her managers. (Id. ^  84, 130.) 
There is no evidence in the record that Heniford, or any other customer, was made aware of 
Hart’s negative comments about him. This difference explains why Luedtke may have 
been punished, and Hart was not. For the same reasons, Hart’s comments about Luedtke’s 
children and display of sexual images at work are not probative of discrimination against 
Bielich. There is no evidence in the record that management was made aware of these
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issues, and there is no evidence that Bielich was terminated for similar conduct, while 
males were not.
Bielich failed to produce any evidence that Ethicon discriminated against
other women.
c) More Favorable Treatment of Male Employees
Although not framed within the context of the second prong of the Fuentes 
test, Bielich does contend that males were treated more favorably at Ethicon because 
Willick and Hart were permitted to discuss personal matters at work without punishment, 
but she was not. (ECF 63 ^  84, 130.) As an initial matter, these situations are unrelated to 
Bielich’s termination, and could not support a reasonable inference of gender 
discrimination in connection with that adverse employment action. Secondly, the record 
reflects that the consistent determinative factor with respect to punishment was whether or 
not management received complaints about the conduct, not whether the actor was male or 
female. (ECF No. 63 ^  17, 84, 130.) The record reflects that customers and co-workers 
complained to management about Bielich and Luedtke; they did not complain about 
Willick or Hart. Finally, there is no evidence that either Willick or Hart disregarded 
management’s instruction not to discuss certain issues at the workplace.
Bielich failed to produce any evidence that Ethicon more favorably treated
men.
Because Ethicon offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for her 
termination, and because Bielich cannot satisfy either prong of the Fuentes test in order to 
establish that Ethicon’s reasons are pretextual, she can create no triable issue with respect 
to her gender discrimination claims. There is no evidence from which a reasonable jury
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could find that Bielich’s gender was a motivating factor in her termination. Judgment 
must be entered in favor of Ethicon on Counts I and X.
D. Disability Discrimination Claims (Counts II, VI, and XI)
1) Applicable Law
a) The Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff 
must show that: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is 
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodations; and (3) she has suffered an adverse employment decision on the basis of 
that disability. Macfarlan, 675 F.3d at 274; Williams, 380 F.3d at 761 (quoting Taylor v. 
Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999)). To satisfy the requirement of 
having a “disability,” a plaintiff may demonstrate: (1) an actual mental or physical 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) a record of such 
impairment; or (3) that his employer regarded him as having a disability. Marinelli v. City 
of Erie, Pa., 216 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
recognizes that concentrating, remembering, cognitive function and thinking are major life 
activities. Emory v. Astrazeneca Pharms., L.P., 401 F.3d 174, 183 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 2002); Taylor, 184 F.3d 
296 at 307.
b) Pretext
The same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to Bielich’s 
disability discrimination claims as set forth above in section IV.C.1(b). Shaner v. Synthes, 
203 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). In the context of the ADA, to establish pretext a
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plaintiff must present specific evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably either: 
(1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious 
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a determinative cause of the employer’s 
action. See footnote 2, supra; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Watson, 207 F.3d at 212-13.
2) The Parties’ Arguments
Ethicon contends that judgment must be entered in its favor on Bielich’s 
disability discrimination claims because Bielich can produce no evidence that any 
non-disabled employee was treated more favorably than her. (ECF No. 46 at 7-8.) 
According to Ethicon, even if Bielich could establish a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination, as with her gender discrimination claims, she cannot establish that its 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating her were pretextual. (Id. at 6-10.)
In response, Bielich argues that she need not prove that similarly-situated 
non-disabled employees were treated more favorably than she was in order to make out a 
disability discrimination claim. (ECF No. 51 at 4) Bielich further contends that Ethicon 
does not dispute that she is disabled and a qualified individual within the meaning of the 
ADA, and that according to recent decisions from the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the fact that she was terminated satisfies the final element 
of her prima facie case. (Id. at 5-7.)
Having satisfied the elements of the prima facie case, Bielich asserts that the 
record is replete with evidence that the reasons given for her termination were pretexts for 
disability discrimination. (Id. at 17-26.) In large part, Bielich relies on the same evidence 
regarding the failings and illegitimacy of the sixty- and ninety-day plans in support of her 
pretext argument under the ADA, as she did in support of her pretext argument under Title
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VII. (ECF No. 51 at 20-26; see, section IV.C.2, above.) She, however, adds references to 
a) management’s after-the-fact denial that she disclosed her PMDD to them, b) 
characterization of her disease as a “personal matter” separate from her performance 
problems, and c) referral of her to the employee assistance program for counseling. (Id. at 
17-19.)
In its reply brief, Ethicon disputes that Bielich is a qualified individual who 
could perform the essential functions of her position with or without reasonable 
accommodation. (ECF No. 53 at 2-4.) Assuming, arguendo, that Bielich could make out a 
prima facie case, Ethicon makes the same counter-arguments with respect to pretext as it 
did in the context of Bielich’s gender discrimination claims.
3) Discussion and Conclusion
a) The Prima Facie Case
The court assumes for purposes of summary judgment that Bielich can 
satisfy the elements of her prima facie disability discrimination case. The question, 
therefore, becomes whether Bielich can prove that Ethicon’s proffered reasons for her 
termination were pretexts for disability discrimination. Because there is no basis on 
which to so find, judgment as a matter of law will be entered in Ethicon’s favor on Counts 
II, VI, XI.
b) Pretext
Assuming for purposes of deciding the instant motion for summary judgment 
that Bielich can establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Ethicon articulated 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory, reasons for terminating her, i.e., continuing performance 
deficiencies with respect to demonstrating a “sense of urgency,” such as, missing deadlines,
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admitting to getting behind, and customer and co-worker complaints with respect to timeliness. 
It is Bielich’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that these were not Ethicon’s 
true reasons for firing her, but were instead pretexts for disability discrimination. Jones, 198 
F.3d at 410. To do so, Bielich must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from 
which a fact-finder could reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate 
reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not the 
determinative cause of the employer's action. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.
i) Prong One
Under the first prong of the Fuentes test, Bielich must identify “such 
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in Ethicon’s 
proffered legitimate reasons for terminating her that a reasonable jury could find them 
“unworthy of credence.” Bielich relies largely on the same evidence already analyzed by the 
court in the context of her gender discrimination claims. Bielich does, however, add 
references to a) management’s after-the-fact denial that she disclosed her PMDD to them, b) 
management’s characterization of her disease as a “personal matter” separate from her 
performance problems, and c) referral of her to the employee assistance program for 
counseling. (ECF No. 51 at 17-26.) Bielich’s ultimate argument, however, remains the same: 
that a reasonable jury could conclude that Ethicon viewed her as a “woman scorned due to 
disability” and used the sixty- and ninety-day plans as a subterfuge for discrimination.
The court’s analysis of Bielich’s innumerable, individual challenges to 
Ethicon’s reasons for firing her in the context of her gender discrimination claims applies with 
equal force here. Here too, the court concludes that none of Bielich’s arguments demonstrate 
such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions that would
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permit a reasonable jury to disbelieve that Ethicon fired Bielich due to poor performance, and 
instead believe that she was fired because of her disability.
Likewise, as with Bielich’s pretext argument in the context of her gender 
discrimination claims, her pretext argument with respect to her disability discrimination claims 
is inherently inconsistent with her failure to accommodate claims. Again, it is Bielich’s 
disability discrimination claims that cannot move forward because they are not supported by 
sufficient evidence to overcome summary judgment. The court’s examination of each of 
Bielich’s challenges to the performance review process remains the same. None of Bielich’s 
new arguments raised in the context of her disability discrimination claims indicate that 
Ethicon’s reasons for terminating her cannot be believed. As an initial matter, management 
concedes for purposes of summary judgment that Bielich disclosed her medical condition to 
them. Bielich’s contention that management labeled her PMDD a “personal matter” and 
referred her to the employee assistance program for counseling does not change the analysis or 
the result. These isolated and separable acts, alone or in combination with any other 
arguments made by Bielich, would not permit a reasonable jury to find Ethicon’s proffered 
reasons for her termination to be unworthy of belief. There is no dispute that Bielich missed 
deadlines, got behind on her work, and that customers and co-workers complained about her 
timeliness in completing tasks and responding to inquiries to management. (ECF No.63 ^  14, 
33, 36, 38, 48-58, 125, 147-51.)
For this reason, Bielich cannot establish that Ethicon’s reasons for terminating 
her are unworthy of belief under the first prong of the Fuentes test.
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ii) Prong Two
Even though Bielich failed to produce evidence that would support a 
reasonable jury finding in her favor under the first prong of the Fuentes test, she can 
survive summary judgment if, under the second prong of the Fuentes test, she demonstrates 
that discrimination was more likely than not a determinative cause of her termination. 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762. Bielich may do so by showing that: 1) Ethicon previously 
discriminated against her; 2) Ethicon discriminated against other disabled employees; or 3) 
Ethicon previously treated more favorably similarly situated non-disabled employees. 
Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644-45. Bielich does not specifically address this second prong of 
the Fuentes test, and accordingly, fails to identify any evidence pertinent to these three 
considerations. The court nevertheless extrapolated evidence of record from Bielich’s 
other arguments that might be relevant to each factor to determine whether her disability 
discrimination claims could possibly survive summary judgment under prong two of the 
Fuentes test. The court concludes that they cannot.
a) Previous Discrimination Against Bielich
There is no evidence that Ethicon previously discriminated against Bielich.
b) Discrimination Against Disabled Employees
Bielich contends that Ethicon discriminated against other disabled 
employees. In support of this contention, Bielich submits evidence to purportedly 
establish that former employees McGinnis, Sawicki, and Smith were all disabled, and were 
all terminated after being placed on PIPs. (ECF 63 ^ 114.) Their treatment, however, is 
not indicative of discrimination against Bielich because their circumstances are different. 
Neither Sawicki nor Smith were terminated; the former resigned and the latter went on
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long-term disability. (ECF No. 52-10 at 22-23; ECF No. 52-3 at 12.) McGinnis’ 
disability, shingles, developed only after he was placed on a PIP, and required that he take 
short-term disability until the condition cleared. (ECF No. 52-10 at 21.)
Based on these differences, and the lack of any other evidence in the record 
making these former-employees’ experiences probative of discrimination against Bielich, a 
reasonable jury could not conclude that disability discrimination was the real reason for 
Bielich’s termination.
c) More Favorable Treatment of Non-Disabled Employees
Bielich submits no evidence that can be viewed as relevant to this
consideration.
Bielich failed to present any probative evidence under the second prong of 
the Fuestes test to indicate that disability discrimination was the real reason for her 
termination.
Because Bielich cannot satisfy either prong of the Fuentes test, she can 
create no triable issue with respect to her disability discrimination claims. There is no 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Bielich’s disability was the 
determinative factor in her termination. The court would reach the same ultimate 
conclusion even if the less-exacting motivating factor test were applied. There is no 
evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Bielich’s 
disability motivated Ethicon’s decision to terminate her employment to any extent. 
Judgment must be entered in favor of Ethicon on Counts II, VI, XI.
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E. Disability Retaliation Claims (Counts V and XIV)
1) Applicable Law
a) The Prima Facie Case
Discrimination against an individual who has opposed a practice prohibited 
by the ADA or who has made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in 
an investigation, proceeding or hearing under the statute is itself actionable conduct. 42 
U.S.C. § 12203(a). The same is true under the PHRA. 43 P.S. § 955(d).
The prima facie case elements for a retaliation claim under the ADA are as 
follows: 1) the plaintiff engaged in activity protected by the antidiscrimination statute; 2) 
the employer took action that a reasonable employee would have found to be materially 
adverse in that it might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination; and 3) there is a causal connection between the 
plaintiff’s opposition to or participation in proceedings against unlawful discrimination and 
the employer's action. Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-42 (3d Cir. 2006). The 
plaintiff does not have to show that she is a qualified individual with a disability to bring a 
retaliation claim. Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., 574 F.3d 169, 191 n.19 (3d Cir. 2009).
b) Pretext
The same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies to Bielich’s 
disability discrimination claims as set forth above in section IV.C.1(b). Shaner, 203 F.3d at 
500; Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500-01. In the context of the ADA, to establish pretext a plaintiff 
must present specific evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably either: (1) 
disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious 
discriminatory reason was more likely than not a determinative cause of the employer’s
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action. See footnote 2, supra; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500-01; Shaner, 
204 F.3d at 501.
2) The Parties’ Arguments
Ethicon contends that Bielich’s disability retaliation claims are deficient 
because she never requested an accommodation, making it impossible to satisfy the first 
prong of the prima facie case. (ECF No. 46 at 19-20.) Even assuming that Bielich could 
make out a prima facie case of disability retaliation, Ethicon argues that she can come forth 
with no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that its proffered reasons for 
terminating her were pretexts for retaliation. (ECF No. 46 at 20; ECF No. 53 at 10.)
In response, relying entirely on argument previously made, Bielich asserts 
that her retaliation claims are triable because a reasonable jury could find that she 
implicitly requested an accommodation. (ECF No. 51 at 25.) Bielich does not address 
Ethicon’s assertion that she is unable to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find its reason for terminating her to be pretextual in the context of her alleged 
retaliation claims. (Id.)
The court assumes for purposes of summary judgment that Bielich can 
satisfy the elements of her prima facie case. As with her discrimination claims, Bielich, 
however, cannot establish that the reasons for her termination were pretexts for disability 
retaliation, and for that reason judgment as a matter of law will be entered in Ethicon’s 
favor on Counts V, IX, and XIV.
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3) Discussion and Conclusion
a) The Prima Facie Case
As an initial matter, the court questions whether, under the facts of this case, 
Bielich can establish the first prong of her prima facie case, i.e., that she engaged in protected 
activity. Here, as will be discussed below, Bielich’s failure to accommodate claims survive 
only because there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Ethicon failed to 
engage in the interactive process in response to her disclosure that a medical condition was 
adversely affecting her work performance. It is undisputed that Beilich never explicitly 
requested an accommodation. There is no evidence that Bielich filed any complaints or 
charges of discrimination within Ethicon, or any other entity. Although she asks in her 
January 6, 2010 email whether a “PIP was the compassionate or helpful way to go” after she 
revealed her PMDD diagnosis to Willick and Tai, it is undisputed that the decision to terminate 
Bielich predated that email, and, regardless, it is questionable whether that statement would 
rise to the level of protected activity itself. (ECF No. 52-7 at 1-4, 8.)
The court, however, will assume for purposes of deciding the instant motion 
for summary judgment that Bielich can establish a prima facie case of disability retaliation.
The question, therefore, becomes whether Bielich can prove that Ethicon’s proffered 
reasons for her termination were pretexts for disability retaliation. Because there is no 
basis on which to so find, judgment as a matter of law will be entered in Ethicon’s favor on 
Counts V and XIV.
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b) Pretext
Ethicon articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory, reasons for terminating her, 
i.e., failing to demonstrate a consistent “sense of urgency,” including missing deadlines, 
getting behind on her goals, and being subject to complaints from customers and co-workers 
with respect to a lack of timeliness. It is again Bielich’s burden to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that these were not Ethicon’s true reasons for firing her, but were instead 
pretexts for retaliation. Jones, 198 F.3d at 410. To do so, Bielich must point to some evidence, 
direct or circumstantial, from which a fact-finder could reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the 
employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason 
was more likely than not a determinative cause of the employer's action. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 
764.
The analysis under prongs one and two of the Fuentes test in the context of 
these claims is identical to that in the context of Bielich’s disability discrimination claims. See, 
section IV.D.3.
Because Bielich cannot satisfy either prong of the Fuentes test, she can 
create no triable issue with respect to her disability retaliation claims. There is no evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could find that Bielich’s protected activity was a 
determinative factor in her termination. The court would reach the same ultimate 
conclusion even if the less-exacting, motivating factor test were applied. There is no 
evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Bielich’s 
protected activity motivated Ethicon’s decision to terminate her employment in any way. 
Judgment must be entered in favor of Ethicon on Counts V and XIV.
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F. Failure to Accommodate Claims (Counts III and XII)
1) The Applicable Law
The ADA specifically provides that an employer “discriminates” against a 
qualified individual with a disability when the employer does not “‘mak[e] reasonable 
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of the individual unless the 
[employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on 
the operation of the business of the [employer].’” Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police 
Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). A reasonable accommodation is one involving “[modifications 
or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the 
position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable an individual with a 
disability who is qualified to perform the essential functions of that position ....” 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(o)(1)(ii). “Reasonable accommodation” further “includes the employer's 
reasonable efforts to assist the employee and to communicate with the employee in good 
faith” ..., under what has been termed a duty to engage in the “interactive process.” 
Williams, 380 F.3d at 761.
Failure to accommodate claims are distinct from claims of disparate 
treatment, and are not governed by the shifting-burden scheme set out in McDonnell 
Douglas. See Walton v. Mental Health Assn. of Southeastern Pa., No. 96-5682, 1997 WL 
717053, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1997); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 
F.3d 252, 263-64 (1st Cir. 1999). Failure to accommodate claims “do[ ] not require that 
an employer's action be motivated by a discriminatory animus directed at the disability.” 
Higgins, 194 F.3d at 264.
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In order to survive summary judgment on a failure to accommodate claim 
under the ADA and the PHRA, a plaintiff must point to evidence in the record sufficient to 
establish that: (1) she was disabled and her employer knew it; (2) she requested an 
accommodation or assistance; (3) her employer did not make a good faith effort to assist; 
and (4) she could have been reasonably accommodated. Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin 
Mem. Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006); Conneen v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 
334 F.3d 318, 330-31 (3d Cir. 2003). Because the analysis of the ADA claim and the 
PHRA claim is identical, the court’s discussion will only reference the ADA going 
forward, with the understanding that the analysis applies with equal force to the PHRA 
claim. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306.
Controlling case law requires an employee to provide the employer with 
both notice of the disability and a request for an accommodation, whereby the employee 
makes clear that she wants assistance for his or her disability. Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 
602 F.3d 495, 506 (3d Cir. 2010). Although an employee's request “does not have to be in 
writing, be made by the employee, or formally invoke the words ‘reasonable 
accommodation,’ ... the employer must know of both the disability and the employee's 
desire for accommodation,” or circumstances must be sufficient to cause a reasonable 
employer to make inquiries about the possible need for an accommodation. Taylor, 184 
F.3d at 313; Conneen, 334 F.3d at 332. A statement by an employee that she is disabled or 
has been diagnosed with a disease or disorder, without more, is insufficient to constitute a 
request for an accommodation. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313; Prigge v. Sears Holding Corp., No. 
09-175, 2010 WL 2731589, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2010). Once an accommodation is 
requested, the employer is required to engage in the interactive process during which the
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employer and employee identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and the 
potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome them. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 311.
Even if the employee requests an accommodation and the employer refuses 
to engage in the interactive process, a prima facie case is not made out unless the employee 
also submits evidence establishing that she could have been reasonably accommodated. 
“The ADA... is not intended to punish employers for behaving callously if, in fact, no 
accommodation for the employee’s disability could reasonably have been made.” Mengine 
v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1997). It is the employee’s burden to show that 
accommodations existed that would have rendered her capable of performing the essential 
functions of the job. Stanley v. Lester M. Prange, Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 581, 584 (E.D. Pa. 
1998). Summary judgment can be granted in favor of the employer where the employee’s 
proposed accommodations would be clearly ineffective. Walton, 168 F.3d at 670.
2) The Parties’ Arguments
Ethicon moves for summary judgment on Bielich’s failure to accommodate 
claims on the grounds that she cannot establish that she requested an accommodation or 
that a reasonable accommodation existed. (ECF No. 46 at 11.) With respect to Bielich’s 
failure to request an accommodation, Ethicon cites to Bielich’s numerous admissions in the 
record that she never explicitly requested an accommodation, and her purported repeated 
assurances to management that she was “ok” and was able to perform her job duties. (Id. at 
12-14.) According to Ethicon, the court cannot find that Bielich requested an 
accommodation because she affirmatively hid her disability from management so that she 
would not be perceived as “weak” or “inadequate.” (Id. at 13-14.)
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With respect to the lack of any reasonable accommodations, Ethicon notes 
that Bielich identified three possible accommodations: (1) “realignment of some of the 
workload”; (2) some leeway for time off to visit doctors; and (3) “occasional days off.” (Id. 
at 15.) According to Ethicon, there is no evidence in the record to establish that Bielich’s 
performance would have improved if she had been given these accommodations. (Id.) 
Ethicon also argues that the ADA does not require an employer to make co-workers’ jobs 
harder, and that, in any event, Bielich acknowledged to her supervisors at the time that her 
workload was less than her fellow team members by assuming responsibility for “booking 
local SSI events” in order to “pull my weight and take some stuff o ff’ her co-worker’s 
plates. (Id. at 15; ECF No. 63 ^ 71.) With respect to time off to attend appointments or to 
rest, Ethicon notes that Bielich’s work-from-home job, for which she set her own work 
hours, already gave her these benefits. (ECF No. 46 at 15-16.)
In response, Bielich contends that the record reflects that Ethicon knew 
about her disability and that she requested an accommodation. (ECF No. 51 at 7-10.) 
According to Bielich, the record reflects that she told each of her managers and the human 
resources department representative about her condition, and also presented with 
symptoms of a mental impairment when she cried in front of her managers and revealed 
suicidal thoughts. (Id. at 8.) Bielich does not contend that she explicitly requested an 
accommodation, but argues that Ethicon knew, or should have known, about her need for 
an accommodation when she told Ethicon, on six occasions between June 2, 2009, and 
January 6, 2010, that her disability was negatively affecting her work. (Id. at 9-12.) 
Bielich contends that a reasonable jury could find in her favor on her failure to 
accommodate claims because Ethicon managers a) admitted that they were not trained on
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how to accommodate a disabled employee, b) failed to follow the procedures set forth in 
Ethicon’s “Accommodations Toolkit”, and c) increased her workload and “watched her 
like hawks” after she disclosed her disability. (Id. at 12-14.)
On the issue of reasonable accommodation, Bielich argues that summary 
judgment should only be granted where the proposed accommodations are either clearly 
inefficient or outlandishly costly. (Id. at 14-15.) Bielich lists six accommodations that 
could have been provided to her, such as notification when she was falling behind, 
step-by-step instructions, job restructuring, provision of better computer systems, periodic 
leave to attend medical appointments or recover from an “episodic manifestation,” and a 
modified job schedule. (Id. at 15-16.) In support of these possibilities, Bielich cites 
testimony from Ethicon human resources personnel that leave, and modified or flexible 
schedules were available to employees with mental disabilities. (Id. at 16; ECF No. 63 ^  
161-62.)
In its reply brief, Ethicon points out that during each of the six 
conversations relied upon by Bielich to support a reasonable jury finding that she requested 
an accommodation, Bielich refused Ethicon’s offers of help, attributed her poor 
performance to other factors, and stated that she was feeling fine. (ECF No. 53 at 8-9.) 
Ethicon notes that Bielich admits in a January 6, 2010 email that she had not previously 
requested any accommodations by stating that it was only “in retrospect” that she realized 
she needed help. (Id. at 9.) According to Ethicon, under these circumstances, no 
reasonable jury could conclude that Bielich made an implicit request for an 
accommodation.
50
Case 2:11-cv-01635-JFC Document 71 Filed 03/20/14 Page 51 of 54
Ethicon also contends that no reasonable jury could conclude that any of 
Bielich’s proposed accommodations would have allowed her to perform adequately the 
functions of her job, especially in light of Bielich’s admission in the January 6, 2010 email 
that “overcommitting.. .is the real issue in my performance.” (Id. at 9-10.) According to 
Ethicon, no reasonable jury could find, on this record, that Bielich’s performance would 
have become adequate with the proposed accommodations.
3) Discussion and Conclusion
The undisputed facts present a close case. Ethicon admits for purposes of 
summary judgment that management personnel knew about Bielich’s condition. It 
disputes only whether Bielich’s communications to management regarding her condition 
would cause a reasonable employer to make inquiries about the possible need for an 
accommodation. In support of its position, Ethicon claims that Bielich told management 
that she was “okay,” affirmatively told management that she could perform her job duties, 
and purposefully hid her disability from her supervisors.
The court would be prepared to conclude that no reasonable jury could find 
that Bielich had implicitly requested an accommodation if the record were as Ethicon 
represents it to be. The record, however, is not so clear. During, at least, Bielich’s June 
2, 2009 telephone call with Willick, her June 24, 2009 telephone call with Tai, her 
September 10, 2009 in-person meeting with Willick, and her December 15, 2009 in-person 
meeting with Tai, Bielich explicitly told Ethicon management and human resources 
personnel that her PMDD explained why her job performance was poor. (ECF No. 63 ^  
18, 19, 29, 34, 59, 101; ECF No. 52-1 at 3-4, 8-9, 21-22.) For purposes of summary 
judgment, the court must accept this evidence as true. A reasonable jury might find that
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these repeated and consistent disclosures would cause a reasonable employer to inquire 
further.
The court recognizes that the record reflects that Bielich also, at times, told 
her supervisors and human resources personnel that there were other reasons for her poor 
performance, such as “overcommitting,” and that she was “feeling better” and was 
optimistic about her ability to do better at work. (ECF No. 52-7 at 8.) The record reflects 
that Bielich feared appearing “weak” or “inadequate” at Ethicon, and that she now admits 
that she was “faking it” at the time. (ECF No. 63 ^  30, 34.) This evidence does not 
comport with Bielich’s testimony that she explicitly told Willick and Tai that her poor 
performance was caused by her PMDD and the medication she was taking to control it. 
These discrepancies will likely be highly probative to a jury deciding what Bielich actually 
said and whether or not Ethicon’s duty to engage in the interactive process was triggered. 
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, however, this court must accept as true that 
Bielich told Willick and Tai in June 2009, and then again in September and December of 
that year, that she was performing poorly at work due to her medical condition and 
treatment.
It is undisputed that Ethicon made no further inquiry with respect to 
precisely how Bielich’s condition or medicine was affecting her job performance. The 
interactive process, at least, imposes a duty upon Ethicon to inquire further, initiate the 
interactive process, and determine whether accommodations were required. The Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit recognizes that a party that fails to communicate by way of 
initiation or response may be acting in bad faith with respect to the interactive process. 
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 312. It is undisputed that Ethicon did nothing more than refer Bielich
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to the employee assistance program for counseling upon her disclosure that her poor 
performance at work was directly related to her PMDD, and treatment for the condition. 
The record reflects that an employee should be referred to the occupational health 
department for assessment upon notifying management that a medical condition is 
affecting job performance. Ethicon’s referral of Bielich to the employee assistance 
program cannot, on this record, satisfy Ethicon’s duty to inquire further and engage in the 
interactive process. On this record, a reasonable jury could find that Bielich implicitly 
requested an accommodation and that Ethicon failed to engage in the interactive process.
This finding is inconsequential, however, if  Bielich cannot also show that 
accommodations existed that would have rendered her capable of performing the essential 
functions of her job. Stanley, 25 F.Supp.2d at 584. This court can enter summary 
judgment in Ethicon’s favor only if Bielich’s proposed accommodations would be clearly 
ineffective. Walton, 168 F.3d at 670. Again, the undisputed facts present a close case. 
Many of the accommodations identified by Bielich may have been already available to her, 
such as a flexible work schedule, and time off to see clinicians, or to recover from 
symptomatic episodes, because Bielich worked from home and set her own hours. (ECF 
No. 63 ^ 12.) In addition, because she was subject to sixty- and ninety-day performance 
plans, Bielich received many of the “reminders” and “step-by-step” lists that she now 
claims would be reasonable accommodations. (Id. ^  42, 46.) Nevertheless, Bielich also 
identifies reassignment of marginal duties and a modified job schedule as possible 
accommodations. (ECF No. 51 at 15-16.)
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On this record, the court cannot conclude that these proposed 
accommodations would be clearly ineffective. Given that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that Ethicon failed to engage in the interactive process, and given that the record 
supports the finding that there were possible accommodations, it would be improper for the 
court to speculate about the kind of accommodation that might have been arrived at had 
Ethicon engaged in the interactive process. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317-18. The record does 
not clearly demonstrate that no accommodation could have permitted Bielich to perform 
the functions of her job, and for that reason entry of judgment as a matter of law in 
Ethicon’s favor on Bielich’s failure to accommodate claims would be error.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Ethicon’s motion for summary judgment will be 
granted, in part. Judgment will be entered in its favor on Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, 
IX, X XI, XIII, XIV. Bielich’s failure to accommodate claims, asserted in Counts III and 
XII, survive summary judgment.
An appropriate order will be filed contemporaneously with this 
memorandum opinion.
Date: March 20, 2014 BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joy Flowers Conti
Joy Flowers Conti
Chief United States District Judge
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